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I. Although the transcript from the hearing on the motion to 
suppress was not included in the record on appeal, the issue of the 
warrantless stop was sufficiently argued during the trial as to make the lack 
of the transcript nonessential to the appellate court's determination of the 
trial court's error in allowing the evidence to be presented at trial. 
Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search 
alleged performed incident to a traffic stop adequately set forth the arguments presented at the 
motion to suppress hearing, with the ruling by the court obvious in the fact that the evidence was 
allowed to be presented at trial. (Transcript pgs. 81-86) All that is lacking is a Motion in 
Opposition to the Motion to Suppress from the State, which the State never prepared or 
submitted to the trial court. 
The argument presented at trial by the State provides this Court with an adequate 
representation of what the testimony was during the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. The 
State presented testimony as to the intensive search conducted by the police for the vehicle in 
which Appellant was a passenger and testimony that indicates that it was based on a tip from a 
confidential informant, rather than a traffic stop. (Transcript pgs. 81-85, 93-96, 124-26) This 
testimony adequately demonstrates that the stop itself was questionable and that the resulting 
search of the Appellant's person and the interior of the car should therefore have been performed 
subject to a warrant, rather than pursuant to a traffic stop. The officers performing the stop had 
no reason to suspect the presence of drugs in the vehicle absent the tip from the confidential 
informant, yet they were allowed to perform a warrantless search supposedly under the auspices 
of a traffic stop. 
1 
1 ; 
officer conducting a "plain-view" search of Appellant's person . Transcript pgs. 130-32, 306-
09) rhe transcript reflects that during a demonstration of the circumstances the officer most 
probably faced the night of the search, it was at the very least difficult for the officer to see 
anything on Appellant's person that would could have been considered incriminating enough to 
the vest worn inside another coat was likely not visible at all. (Transcript pgs. 306-309) 
There seems to be enough evidence betote this (. out! in llic iceuid on appeal loi iht; 
Court to make a ruling as to the error or lack thereof committed by the trial court without the 
need for the transcript from the motion to suppress hearing. Therefore, the lack of the inclusion 
of the transci ipt ii i qi lestion ii i the record oi i appeal woi ild not be preji idicial 
n. Although the transcript for the motion to suppress hearing was 
not included in the transcript for the record on appeal, the issue of the lack of 
a knowing, voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights by Appellant due to his 
being under the influence of Valium and alcohol was adequately raised and 
argued at trial to allow this Court to make a determination as to the trial 
court's error or lack thereof in allowing the "confession" to be introduced at 
trial. 
The argument above concerning the lack of a transcript also applies to this section. 
Appellant's memorandum of point and authorities accompanying the motion to suppress, as well 
as the argument pi esei ited at !i ial clearl) set fortl i the argi n nents I leard at the suppressioi t. 
hearing, again with the State failing to prepare and file a motion in opposition. 
1 he testimoi i> introduced at t r ia l ! i oi i i - appellant ciei i lonstrates his lack c f Ii ill and 
rational understanding and comprehension during the night in question and also his consumption 
o f alcohol and Valium. (Transcript pgs. 305-06) Further, the amount of Valium consumed by 
2 
defendant was substantiated by Modesto Pacheo at the trial and not at the suppression hearing. 
(Transcript pgs 238-41) 
In furtherance of his argument, his behavior that evening, testified to by Officer Hooley 
and Officer Hendricks, would be consistent with the standard influence such substances have on 
the average person. (Transcript pgs. 101-02,136-38) Appellant was calm, mellow, overly 
cooperative despite being in a highly stressful situation. Nor does his behavior in gathering up 
all the drugs to himself demonstrate the thinking of a rational individual. 
i n . Although the issue of double jeopardy is being raised for the 
first time on appeal, the Court should rule on the issue since it is an issue of 
first impression in the Utah courts, making it therefore an exceptional 
circumstance since the issue is incapable of being appealed under a claim of 
plain error. 
The issue of double jeopardy, as it pertains to a prosecution for both possession of a 
controlled substance and failure to pay the tax under the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, has 
never been ruled on in the Utah courts and therefore there is no basis for alleging "plain error" in 
the trial court's ruling since there is no precedent with which the ruling can conflict. Therefore, 
while Appellant failed to allege "plain error" on the issue of double jeopardy, it would have been 
difficult to do so since this is an issue of first impression. A court faced with this issue, having 
never been decided by another court in Utah, would have no way of knowing what an erroneous 
ruling on the issue would be. 
To be able to allege "plain error" on the part of the trial court, there are two requirements 
that must be met These requirements are set forth in State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert 
denied, 110 S.Ct 62 (1989). The first requirement is that the error be plain, i.e., should have 
been obvious to the trial court that it was committing error. Id at 354. The second requirement 
3 
is that the error affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., harmful. 14. The second 
requirement is easily met since Appellant was exposed to severe fines and penalties under the 
Stamp Act due to the trial court's interpretation of the statute's provision concerning impure and 
diluted substances. The first requirement is not so easily met since it cannot be obvious to the 
trial court that it was committing error since there has never been a ruling with which the trial 
court in this case must have conformed to in order to avoid "plain error." It is a harsh stance to 
require Appellant to allege "plain error" in order to appeal his conviction when it is impossible 
for him to do so. 
This situation of dealing with an issue of first impression could be seen to present an 
"exceptional circumstance" which justifies its being raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Archambeau. 820 P. 2d 920 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) speaks of the "exceptional circumstances" 
exception. This exception is allowed so as to prevent manifest injustice that would result from 
failure to consider an issue on appeal. Id Since the issue of the possible double jeopardy 
effect of this type of prosecution has never been decided before, it is not one which would be 
readily apparent during the trial phase of the prosecution and is one on which there is no real 
possibility of alleging "plain error" due to the lack of precedent upon which an error can be 
judged. To not allow Appellant to raise this issue on appeal would result in "manifest injustice" 
since it would penalize Appellant for the lack of precedent that prevents him from alleging 
"plain error." 
There is also the unusual circumstance in this case of the State prosecuting Appellant in 
district court, rather than before the Utah Tax Commission. In the previous cases where the 
Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act was being enforced, the matter was taken up civilly before the 
4 
Tax Commission, leading this Court that heard the appeals from those decisions to classify those 
proceedings as quasi-criminal in view of the severity of the tax imposed. See Zizzi v. State Tax 
Commission, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Sims v. Collection Division of State Tax Commission. 
841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992). Cf. State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d431 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990)(constitutional 
challenge to Stamp Act not reached); State v. Davis. 787 P.2d 517 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990)(issue of 
self-incrimination decided). In this case, the State prosecuted Appellant on the criminal portion 
of the Stamp Act, not the tax provisions. This leaves the district court with next to no guidance 
as to how the issues presented by the Stamp Act are to be handled. Therefore, the district court 
is incapable of clearly erring in their judgment, whiph then hampers an attempt at appeal by 
cutting off one of the few avenues to appeal that would allow Appellant to raise a defense that 
was not readily apparent at the time of trial. 
State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990), allowed the appellant in that case to 
raise the issue of double jeopardy for the first time on appeal, citing the liberty interest 
exception. This liberty exception was further discussed in State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1991), where the Court found that the liberty exception was too broad to justify 
raising a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal by itself, but that it was usually invoked 
in situations involving "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances'5 as well. 
[A] defendant may not assert a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal 
unless he can demonstrate "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances." The fact 
that a "liberty interest" is at stake is merely one factor articulated by the [Utah 
Supreme Court] to be considered when determining whether "exceptional 
circumstances" exist. 
Id. at 925. In this case, Appellant's liberty is at stake due to the Stamp Act's imposition of 
criminal penalties. This fact, combined with the unusualness of the State's prosecution of the 
5 
violation of the Stamp Act in district court rather than before the Tax Commission and the 
unavailability of the "plain error" exeption, lead to the conclusion that "exceptional 
circumstances" exist that would allow the issue of double jeopardy to be raised for the first time 
on appeal. 
Contrary to the State's representation of the validity of Appellant's double jeopardy 
claim, the Stamp Act does include the element of intent to distribute in its proof requirements. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 59-19-106(2) states that "a dealer distributing or possessing marijuana 
or a controlled substance without affixing the appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia is 
guilty of a third degree felony." (Emphasis added). While a dealer is defined in Section 59-19-
102(2) as one who "manufactures, produces, ships, transports, or imports into Utah or in any 
manner acquires or possesses" more than the specific amounts of controlled substances listed in 
the Stamp Act, the commonly understood definition of a dealer implies the intent to distribute 
the controlled substance. If the person accused of possession of a controlled substance intended 
it only for personal use, he would not be classified as a "dealer," only as a "user." The 
Webster's definition of the word "deal" is "to apportion: distribute." Therefore, the Stamp Act, 
which specifically applies to dealers, includes the element of intent to distribute. 
As put forth in Appellant's Brief, all of the elements required for conviction for 
possession with intent to distribute are included in the elements required for conviction under 
the Stamp Act with the Stamp Act adding the additional element of a failure to affix the tax 
stamps to the controlled substance. This therefore makes possession with intent to distribute a 
lesser included offense to the violation of the Stamp Act. Duran v. Cook. 788 P.2d 1038 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1990) states that a defendant may be convicted either of a greater or a lesser included 
6 
offense arising from a single criminal episode, but not both offenses. An offense is considered 
included if it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged. Where two crimes are such that the greater cannot be 
committed without necessarily having committed the lesser, one cannot be convicted for both. 
IV. The statutory vagueness challenge to the Illegal Drug Stamp 
Tax Act was preserved for appeal, despite the lack of the use of the specific 
wording, due to the fact that the vagueness of the quantity provisions in the 
statute were raised to the consciousness of the trial court at trial. 
During the course of the trial, the trial court heard a motion to dismiss advanced by 
Appellant based on the fact that the language of the statute was unclear as to how much of a 
controlled substance must be found within an impure or diluted substance in order for the entire 
amount of the substance to qualify for the tax under the Stamp Act. (Transcript pgs. 334-337) 
"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108. 92 S.Ct. 
2294, 2298 (1972). The statutory language should be sufficiently clear that people of ordinary 
intelligence can understand what is required for compliance. Id at 104,2298-99. The trial court 
expressed uncertainty as to how the statute was intended to be interpreted, therefore, it stands to 
reason that the meaning of the statute was also unclear to people of ordinary intelligence. If the 
trial court itself is uncertain as to the proper interpretation of the statute's provisions, then it 
cannot be frivolous for one who is charged with a crime to ask for an interpretation of the statute 
from an appellate court. 
The trial court heard argument from Appellant and the State concerning the 
interpretation of the statute as to that question and found in favor of the State based on a 
7 
comparison with other statutes concerning dealers and on his own ideas as to the reasons behind 
the Legislature's wording of the provision in question. (Transcript p. 336) This demonstrates 
that the question as to the statutory vagueness of the statute was raised to the consciousness of 
the trial court and therefore preserved for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing Reply Memorandum, it appears that there is a sufficient record 
on appeal for the issues put forward by Appellant to survive a summary dismissal and to allow 
the issues raised in Appellant's brief to be heard and decided by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
rBarton-Coombs, Esq. 





As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Controlled substance" means any drug or substance, whether real or counterfeit, as defined 
in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in 
violation of Utah laws. It does not include marihuana. 
(2) "Dealer" means a person who, in violation of Utah law, manufactures, produces, ships, 
transports, or imports into Utah or in any manner acquires or possesses more than 421/2 grams 
of marihuana, or seven or more grams of any controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units 
of any controlled substance which is not sold by weight. 
(3) "Marihuana" means any marihuana, whether real or counterfeit, as defined in Section 
58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation 
of Utah laws. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-102, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 246, ° 2. 
59-19-106. Civil penalty - Criminal penalty - Statute of limitations - Burden of proof. 
Statute text 
(1) Any dealer violating this chapter is subject to a penalty of 100% of the tax in addition to the 
tax imposed by Section 59-19-103. The penalty shall be collected as part of the tax. 
(2) In addition to the taxpenalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possessing marihuana or 
controlled substances without affixing the appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(3) An information, indictment, or complaint may be filed upon any criminal offense under this 
chapter within six years after the commission of the offense. This subsection supersedes any 
provisions to the contrary. 
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by the commission are presumed to be valid and correct. The 
burden is on the taxpayer to show their incorrectness or invalidity. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-106, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 246, ° 6; 1989, ch. 242, ° 2. 
